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I.  INTRODUCTION
When the UNIDROIT Principles (the Principles) were published in 1994
they were considered to be “soft law” and hence not binding on the courts.1
However, these principles have demonstrated that they are offering concrete
and worthwhile solutions and arguably are a move forward in harmonizing
and unifying contract laws.  Indeed, the intention of the UNIDROIT Working
Groups was to “develop a set of norms best suited to accommodate the needs
of the international commercial community.”2  The Principles themselves
argue that it reflects “concepts to be found in many, if not all, legal systems.”3
As a result the Principles are not:  “a rigid and limitative legal source but
instead leave considerable room for flexibility, either to accommodate specific
provisions to further individual parties’ interest in their private dealings, or to
promote national trade and economic policies.4  This makes the Principles a
unique tool to be adapted into any contract and arguably protect the parties’
just expectations arising from their contract.5
Significantly, an extensive body of academic writing and reported case
law has shown that the Principles are a practical solution to the interpretation
and application of contracts.6  The Principles have impacted in a significant
way specifically on the solution of disputes in arbitration.7  Furthermore in
2004 a new edition of the Principles has been published enlarging the field of
impact beyond simple contractual laws.
116 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 26:115
8. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 3, Preamble.
9. See Christiana Fountoulakis, The Parties’ Choice of ‘Neutral Law’ in International Sales
Contracts, 7 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM, 303, 322 (2005).  See also specifically n.124 for
further references on this matter.
10. Art. 3 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament ane the Council on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM(2005) 650 final, 2005/0261 (COD).
11. See Huang Dahan, The UNIDROIT Principles and their Influence in the Modernisation of
Contract Law in the People’s Republic of China, 8 UNIF. L. REV. (n.s.) 107, 107 (2003).
This demonstrates that the Principles are responding to the needs of a
globalised market and have taken on the mantle of a lex mercatoria.  This
issue has been specifically addressed in the preamble which suggests that the
Principles may be applied when the parties agreed that the contract be
governed “by general principles of laws the lex mercatoria or the like.”8  Due
to the extended application of the Principles in arbitration the argument can
be advanced that the theoretical or soft law stage has passed and the Principles
have entered into the phase of “case-hardened” law.  Such a view is, however,
not universally accepted.  The argument is still advanced that the UNIDROIT
Principles are not “real law” but “merely a collection of general acknowledged
principles”9 and hence cannot replace applicable laws.  Such arguments are
not convincing as the Principles are increasingly applied in arbitration without
much opposition.  Furthermore, the European Regulation Proposal (Rome I)
of December 2005 recommended that the UNIDROIT Principles will be
authorized as being a possible choice when deciding the applicable contractual
law.10
Despite the recognition of the UNIDROIT Principles—as far as litigation
is concerned—reference to has only been made in obiter and furthermore only
in limited cases.
A.  Application of the Principles
Despite all the controversies the Principles have affected domestic law.
The effect is that the Principles have influenced municipal law in some
countries through transplantation and have also been used as a model in the
modernisation of domestic laws, specifically the Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China.11
As another example the Principles played a major role in the
modernisation of the Estonian Law of Obligation.  The Principles together
with the CISG formed not only the basis for the drafting of sales laws but have
“also been an important source for drafting [and underpinning] the general
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provisions” such as breach of contract.12  Therefore, the contemplation rule
that is the foreseeability of loss has become a cornerstone in the Estonian
domestic Law of Obligations.13
Furthermore, courts have referred to the Principles on several occasions.
It is specifically instructive to note the views expressed in Hideo Yoshimoto
v. Canterbury Golf International Ltd.,14 where the New Zealand Court of
Appeal found it necessary to refer to the UNIDROIT Principles and the CISG
as they grappled with difficulties in interpreting a contract.  Specifically the
advantages of article 4.3 of the Principles were explained as allowing the court
a more realistic approach in the interpretation of contracts.  However, the
court did not apply the Principles or the CISG for that matter, as they were not
prepared to go beyond these declarations.  The court commented:  “But while
this Court could seek to depart from the law as applied in England and bring
the law in New Zealand into line with these international conventions, I do not
think it would be permitted to do so by the Privy Council.”15  Therefore, there
is, arguably, sufficient evidence that domestic systems have engaged in
considering the Principles in the process of “creeping” transplantation.  Bonell
points out that the Principles are useful as a means of interpreting and
supplementing the otherwise applicable law in cross border transactions.16
This paper is not concerned how the Principles have influenced arbitral
decisions or how transplantation will affect domestic contract law.  Nor is this
paper concerned with cross border transactions.  Of interest is only the effect
an express inclusion of the Principles—or just some provisions—would have
on a domestic contract.
The starting point to this investigation is the well-established practice that
a legal system is obliged to give meaning to express terms in a contract unless
these terms are in breach of a mandatory law.  The question, therefore, is
whether a court would apply clauses which run contrary to well-established
domestic legal principles such as the parol evidence rule.  For the purpose of
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this paper only the application of the parol evidence rule and hence article 4.3
of the Principles will be investigated.17
Simply put the question is whether the courts interpret and apply the
Principles in a manner which was contemplated by the promoters.  This paper
will not investigate the result of an inclusion of the Principles if article 4.3 is
not also part of the contractual terms.  It is arguably correct to assume that in
the absence of article 4.3 a domestic court would follow its own interpretative
mandate and would ignore the interpretative mandate of the Principles.  The
reason arguably is that any express term would be interpreted with domestic
principles in mind, as the court would simply follow established domestic
principles of interpretation.
In sum, the interesting problem is whether express terms of a contract
including interpretive ones will override the domestic contract law.  It is
understood that this paper is of rather theoretical nature in so far as
Australasia18 is concerned.  An inclusion of the Principles as terms into a
domestic contract has not yet eventuated.  However, it is hoped that it will
spark some interest and that it will expose the UNIDROIT Principles to
further scrutiny and research and perhaps even widen its application among
the business community.
II.  THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
Undoubtedly the Principles have provided potential solutions to national
courts as seen in Hideo Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf International Ltd.19 and
others.  However, it never went beyond an admission that the Principles
represent best international practices.  The problem—especially in New
Zealand—was the fear that an appeal would overturn a decision based on the
Principles.  Arguably, the court was concerned that an alternative to the parol
evidence rule would not be acceptable as it is not part of domestic law.  It is
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a clear indication that model laws cannot be introduced into a domestic system
without establishing a compelling reason to do so.
In arbitration, compelling reasons were found and the strength and, hence,
application of the Principles is well established.  Arguably, the reason is that
in arbitration a common concept and a common language is easily understood
and can be readily applied to many situations where laws of different
countries would be in conflict.  Most importantly, the conflict of laws problem
is minimised and many arbitral procedural laws do allow the arbitrators to
exercise a choice in the absence of an express choice of a governing law.
However, even in arbitration, the problem still is—as Lando so aptly
described—that “[s]cholars who cultivate their own domestic garden greatly
outnumber those of the new . . . regime.”20  The advantage of the Principles,
like the CISG, simply is that its language is clear and, therefore, the
regulations are free from detailed digressions and exceptions so frequently
found in the common law.
The problem is and will remain so for a while that ethnocentricity is
simply difficult to overcome, as judges will understandably apply what is
familiar to them.  The difficulty to change the “mindset” can be discovered in
the earlier decisions involving the CISG, a mandatory law, where a lack of
understanding led to wrong decisions.
The overcoming of the ethnocentric trap is even more difficult if a soft
law ought to be taken into consideration.  Importantly, the Principles do not
represent the lowest common denominator but are based on old and tested
features which have stood the test of time and, hence, they will not become
obsolete.21  For that reason, the Principles are an instrument which courts can
look to for guidance.  The question though is how far will court look for and
apply the Principles in a way the promoters intended it to be used.  Unlike the
CISG, which is a convention and once ratified becomes part of domestic law
the Principles are merely “voluntary” in character.
The UNIDROIT Principles (2004) in the Preamble state the Purposes of
the Principles.  The introductory sentence reads:  “These Principles set forth
general rules for international commercial contracts.”22  On first reading
therefore the Principles appear to be only applicable to, first international
contracts and, secondly, commercial contracts.  This suggests that those
contracts which do not involve an “international” element, should not be able
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to rely on the Principles.  The second proviso appears to be an exclusion of
consumer contracts which are largely governed by mandatory domestic laws
and as such freedom of contract is curtailed.
However, the Principles—perhaps ambitiously—note that despite being
conceived for international contracts, they nevertheless can also be applied to
purely domestic contracts “subject to the mandatory rules of the domestic
law.”23  Two aspects need to be considered:  first, does the domestic law
consider the parol evidence rule to be a default rule or a mandatory rule; and
secondly, do the Principles indicate or explain what mandatory rules are.
The Principles are silent as to the meaning of mandatory laws.  On the
other hand a study of the Commission on European Contract Law is of
assistance in the determination of mandatory laws.  The Principles of
European Contract Law devote two articles to this matter.  Article 15:101 in
brief states that a contract is of no effect if “it is contrary to principles
recognised as fundamental.”24  The fundamental principles envisaged in this
article are not merely national concepts but internationally recognised
principles of immorality, illegality and public policy to mention a few.25
Therefore it can be argued that a principle such as the parol evidence rule
would not be considered to fall under this article.
Furthermore, Article 15:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law
directly states that a contract has no effect if it infringes mandatory rules.26
The commentary suggests that this article in effect is only applicable to rules
“or prohibitions expressly or impliedly making contracts null, void, voidable,
annullable, or unenforceable in particular circumstances.”27
In relation to the parol evidence rule it can be argued that it is a default
rule and not a mandatory rule.  The most powerful argument is by looking at
the Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Acts.  In essence with the introduction
of the CISG some mandatory rules such as in the Evidence Act had to be
amended in order to be compatible with the CISG.  No amendments had to be
made to the parol evidence rule.  Furthermore, courts in Australia are adopting
article 8 of the CISG which in essence is similar to article 4.3 of the
Principles.  It is safe to conclude that the parol evidence rule does not fall
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under the category of mandatory rules—but as mentioned above—is a default
rule.
This leads the argument back to what the Preamble to the Principles
states—:  “[the rules] shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by them.”  Of interest is also that the Preamble suggests
that the Principles may be used “as a substitute for a domestic law otherwise
applicable.”28
III.  THE PRINCIPLES AND CONTRACT LAW
The proposition that the Principles can be applied in domestic law is not
impossible.  The Uniform Commercial Code in the 2001 revision redrafted
article 1.302.  The comment 2 to the article states:
. . . parties may vary the effect of the [UCC] code’s provisions by stating that their
relationship will be governed by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable to
commercial transactions.  Such bodies of rules or principles may include for example
those that are promulgated by intergovernmental authorities such as UNCITRAL or
UNIDROIT . . . .
As Bonell commented the reference to the Principles in the UCC is contained
in the principle of “freedom of contract” and not with the “parties’ right to
choose the applicable law.”29  Such distinction becomes significant only if
provisions of the Principles are incompatible with domestic mandatory laws.
The problem however, as indicated above, is that chapter 4 of the
UNIDROIT principles nullifies the domestic principle of constructing a
contract.  This presupposes of course that the contract does not contain a
merger clause.  Pursuant to article 2.1.17 of the Principles a contract which
contains a merger clause the “writing completely embodies the terms on which
the parties have agreed.”30  Therefore these terms cannot be contradicted or
supplemented by any other means such as pre- or post contractual conduct.
In brief the question is whether a court would give priority to the
interpretive mandate of the Principles and not revert to the domestic parol
evidence rule, as the contract is ostensibly one of a domestic nature.  There are
several articles within the Principles which need to be considered in addition
to article 4.3.
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Article 4.1 does not pose any problems as it merely requests that a
contract shall “be interpreted according to the common intention of the
parties.”31  There is no conflict with the parol evidence rule as both rules seek
to establish the common intent of the parties.  However article 4.3 deviates
markedly from the parol evidence rule by first stating that both articles 4.1 and
4.2 must be interpreted by taking the relevant circumstances into
consideration.  These circumstances are:
a) preliminary negotiations, b) the established practices between the parties, c) the
subsequent conduct of the parties, d) nature and purpose of the contract, e) the common
meaning given to terms and f) usage.32
The Principles, therefore, apply both the “subjective” test and the
“reasonableness” test.33
Common law courts in general solved the interpretative problem by
taking a stance which ostensibly promotes certainty and predictability in
contract performance and is expressed as follows:  “The primary rule is simply
to ascertain the meaning of the language of the contract and therefore . . .
evidence of the pre-contractual negotiations of the parties or their subsequent
conduct cannot be used in aid of the construction of a written contract.”34  In
other words only the evidence of the written contract will be considered.
Simply put the law of contract is not concerned with the subjective intent of
parties.  It only protects an expectation which, in an objective sense, is
common to both parties.35  This view was confirmed in Investors
Compensation Scheme Limited v. West Bromwich Building Society.36  Lord
Hoffman in his influential judgment did not embrace the introduction of
subjective intent.  Indeed in principle three he argues that:  “(3) The law
excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the
parties and their declarations of subjective intent.”37  In the United States the
Revised U.C.C article 2.202 also suggests that; “when the parties have a
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written final agreement, that agreement may not be contradicted by parol
evidence.”38
However Lord Steyn admitted that a rule cannot be absolute and
unqualified, as it would defeat the reasonable expectations of commercial
men.39  Lord Hoffmann himself pointed out that the rule is not unqualified, as
subjective intent is “admissible only in an action for rectification.”40
Interestingly, in Australia, Mason J. also pointed out that:  “the prior oral
argument of the parties being inadmissible in aid of construction, though
admissible in an action for rectification.”41  Put simply, the subjective test is
in essence rejected if the contract needs to be constructed.  The more
expansive tests of the Principles are not mirrored in domestic law.
This in itself does not mean that courts cannot make use of and apply the
Principles in an interpretation of a domestic contract.  However, an important
point needs to be considered.  A court cannot rely on any domestic principles
or precedent which would give guidance in this matter as jurisprudence simply
is not available.
The point is that, despite the applicable law being domestic in nature,
only international jurisprudence can be relied upon to assist the courts in their
interpretation.  In addition, the CISG, having been ratified, could also be
viewed analogically as being of assistance.  The CISG can be regarded as
being domestic in nature as it forms part of municipal law.  This is not new
and does not pose any problem as courts already have grappled with and
solved this problem.
A.  The Principles and International Contract Law
Arguably an ethnocentric approach—that is a reliance on domestic law
only—could be challenged.  The Australian High Court has recognized that
the “goal” of international law is the mandate of uniformity.  The Principles
could also be included into this regime as they are international in character.
It is encouraging to note that the High Court understands that uniformity of
law is an important feature which contributes towards certainty and
predictability in international trade.  Especially in the area of
transplantation—in this case the Warsaw Convention—it has been recognized
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that:  “decision must be reached by this Court with close attention to any
relevant developments of international law, including decisions of the
municipal courts of other states parties.”42  The Australian High Court went
even further and clearly stated that “[n]o differentiation could be drawn on the
basis that it was not obligatory for Australia to apply the language of the
Warsaw Convention to domestic carriage by air within Australia.”43
The mere fact that the Warsaw Convention was transplanted into
Australian domestic law was sufficient for the High Court to abandon
ethnocentric interpretation in favor of an international one.  Considering that
the Principles are not a transplantation nor ratified as a treaty should not
detract from their usefulness.  Arguably a reason not to adopt an international
interpretation would be difficult to maintain.
However this leads to another point which needs to be investigated.
Considering that the Principles are not “home grown” and are not part of the
domestic law, the question must be asked whether analogically recourse to
private international law would yield a different result.  The point is that in
English private international law, a contractual clause cannot contain two
competing applicable laws.44  Furthermore, the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990 does not permit a non-country specific law to govern a contract.45
This would lead to the conclusion that the Principles would not be allowed to
govern the contract or for that matter any aspects of the contract such as the
interpretation of the contract.
Of importance in this analysis is the recent decision in Bank Shamil of
Bahrain v. Beximco.46  In that particular contract one of the clauses stated,
“[s]ubject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia’a, this Agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England.”47
Arguably by including the Principles into a domestic contract the same
result could be achieved namely that the law of say Australia applies but the
construction and possibly parts of the contact are subject to the Principles.  At
first glance such a clause would be enforceable by the fact that English and
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Australian courts have always been willing to apply a set of codified laws
such as the Warsaw Convention into the contract as a paramount clause.48
Simply put it can be argued that the inclusion of the Principles into a
contract is deemed to have satisfied the above test.  The Principles or specified
articles are an international set of rules which are apt to be incorporated into
a contract and are sufficiently identifiable.
However, this conclusion is somewhat contradicted by the Rome
Convention article 1(1) which states that the rules of this convention shall
apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between
the laws of different countries.  Furthermore, article 3(3) “make[s] it clear that
the convention as a whole only contemplates and sanctions the choice of the
law of a country.”49  The English Court of Appeal specifically noted that
systems of law such as the lex mercatoria or general principles of law are
excluded.  As a result they rejected the Banks contention that the choice of
law clause is enforceable.50  This finding would suggest that the Court of
Appeal would have arguably also rejected the Principles.
However such a conclusion is not correct.  The argument can be advanced
that the Principles are to be distinguished from the lex mercatoria or “general
principles of Law” insofar as they consist of a body of specifically discernable
laws which are not couched in general language but are in “written” form
hence applicable as any system of law would be.  Furthermore it is not a
choice between one system of law but rather an application of general terms
and conditions which are specific and not general in nature as in the above
case.  The reference to the law of Sharia’ as stated in general terms, is of a
broad nature and indeterminable as to which parts are applicable.
However, there is a distinction between a general reference to a foreign
body of law—whether black letter law of soft law—and the incorporation of
specific terms of such a body into a contract.
Indeed the court of appeal pointed out that:
The doctrine of incorporation can only sensibly operate where the parties have by the
terms of their contact sufficiently identified specific “black letter” provisions of a foreign
law or an international code or set of rules apt to be incorporated as terms of the relevant
contract such as particular article or articles of the French Civil Code or the Hague
Rules.51
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The conclusion, therefore, is that the Principles incorporated as terms of
the contract only have effect as a matter of contract.52  Hence parties making
an express choice, either of a foreign law or an internationally recognisable
set of rules, will have their choice recognised and applied within the
governing law of the contract.  Therefore Australian domestic law will be
applied as the governing law in the application of the terms of the contract.
Put simply a court will give effect to terms if either the Principles as a whole
or clearly identifiable parts of the principles are included into the contract.  It
should be clear by now that such choices cannot be inconsistent with
mandatory laws of the forum.
CONCLUSION
As pointed out above this paper is merely an exploration of possibilities
in contracting which has been brought about by taking a different view on
contractual obligations.  This view is based on comparative work which has
mainly concentrated on legal principles to be applied in international trade
but—as argued—can also be extended to domestic situations.
The problem is not whether the Principles are applicable—that is can they
be validly incorporated into contracts—but rather whether domestic courts are
able and willing to implement contracts in the light of the interpretative
mandate which basically runs contrary to the domestic parol evidence rule.
It has been argued that the parol evidence rule is not a mandatory law hence
it can be replaced with different rules on which the contracting parties have
agree upon such as the UNIDROIT Principles.
Two conflicting forces would be at play here namely the duty of the court
to apply contractual clauses and the principle that decisions of a different
jurisdiction can only be persuasive.  Of special interest—and not discussed in
this paper—is whether an application of only domestic precedent would allow
an aggrieved party to appeal on a point of law.
Hopefully the application of the UNIDROIT principles does not suffer the
same fate as the application of foreign law.  A study of 40 American decisions
showed that in 36 cases the foreign law was either wrongly applied or the
result was highly doubtful.53
The conclusion simply is that the outcome of an application of a contract
relying on the UNIDROIT Principles depends on the ability of a domestic
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court to recognize that they need to step outside the domestic system and
simply not apply the parol evidence rule.
